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SUMMARY:

Petr contends:

(1) An FIU C-insured, non-

~~~~ ~

equity certificate of deposit, bearing a ~f~~ ~~ ~a ~e E f interest

~/_~~-,__

and issued by a commercial bank, is not a "security" under the
.,t..o ~,.RL~ ;..::( L /
1933 Act or the 1934 Act; and (2) ~
wr'tte~ ~i-d~
inter alia, that resps would rece ve 50% of the profits of a

~~~

business, did not create a "secur1ty" under the 1933 Act or the

1934 Act.
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-2FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

2.

In 1976, Marine Bank made

several loans to Columbus Packing Company, an unincorporated
business owned by Mr. and Mrs. Piccirillo.

Columbus Packing

operated a wholesale slaughterhouse and a retail meat market.

In

1978, concerned that the Piccirillos would be unable to repay
these loans, Marine Bank negotiated a new loan agreement with
Columbus Packing.

The

bank ~ Columbus

secured by security interests

~ equipment,

Packing $65,000,
inventory, and

accounts receivable, liens on motor vehicles, and liens on two
pieces of real estate.

Mr. and Mrs. Weaver, who were farmers

engaged in auctioning livestock, guaranteed payment of the
Piccirillos' debt up to $50,000.

They pledged to the bank a
------~~~-------------~
$50,000 certificate of deposit that Marine Bank had issued to
them.

~

This~erti ~ate of~ eposi ~

interest, payable in six years.

earned a fixed rate of

Prior to

cl~sing

on the loan,

the guaranty agreement, and the pledge, the Piccirillos and the
.
Weavers entered into a written agreement which provided that the
Weavers would receive 50% of the adjusted net profits of Columbus
Packing so long as the weavers remained co-obligors, that the
Weavers would receive $100 per month until the loan was repaid,
that the Weavers could veto any future loans to Columbus Packing,
and that the Weavers could use the barn and pasture on the
packinghouse premises at the discretion of the Piccirillos.
The Piccirillos used the proceeds of the $65,000 loan to
repay past loan and overdraft obligations, to pay federal taxes,
and to repay creditors.
capital.

This left only $3800 for working

Four months later, Columbus Packing filed a bankruptcy

-3-

petition.

Marine Bank sought to resort to the Weavers' pledged

certificate of deposit, since the bank's security and Columbus
Packing's property were inadequate to repay the loan.
The Weavers filed suit in USDC, claiming that Marine had
violated §lO(b) of the 1934 Act, §17(a) of the 1933 Act, and the
-------------~-------------~

Pennsylvania Securities Act.

""'

The DC granted summary judgment for

Marine Bank, holding as a matter of law that the certificate of
deposit was not a security and that the written agreement between
the Weavers and the Piccirillos did not create a security.l

A

divided CA reversed; holding:
---")

"From the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions
on file, . • • a fact-finder could find that . .
• employees of the bank approached the Weavers
and urged them to make an investment in Columbus
Packing for the purpose of providing working
capital • • • . Further, it could be foun ~ that
the Weavers . • • w~ re Rersuaded td' pledge their
Certif' ate ~f e osit in exc ange or a
000
loan to Colum us Pa~ ing on the represen a 1on
tnat substantially all of the loans would be
available EO that business for working capital,
and on the representation that the existing
collateral adequately protected both their
interest and the bank's. • • •
"A fact-finder certainly could on the record

1 before us find that the

~k's la ~ula~ive and
deceptive conduct, if it took p ace, was in
con ~ ith the execution and delivery of an
agreement between the Piccirillos and the Weavers
by which, in consideration of their pledge of a
$50,000 Certificate of Deposit to enable Columbus
Packing to obtain a working capital loan, they
were given a 50% interest in the anticipated
profits of the Piccirillo's slaughterhouse."

I

lr have attached the definition of "security" under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.

-4(1)

The agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos

could be found by a trier-of-fact2 to be a certificate of
interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement, or an
investment contract, or both.

(a) The classic example of a

certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing
arrangement cited by Professor Loss is a contract whereby the
buyer furnishes funds and the seller the skill for speculating in
the stock or commodities market under an arrangement to split
profits.

See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 489.

There is no

reason why a sale of an interest in the future profits of a
slaughterhouse should be treated differently.

(b) In SEC v. W.J.

Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946), the Court stated that the
test for distinguishing an investment contract from a mere
commercial or a consumer transaction is "whether the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with
profits to come solely from the efforts of others."

The DC erred

in holding as a matter of law that this agreement was not an
investment contract.3
(2)

The DC also erred in holding as a matter of law that

the certificate of deposit was not a security.

In Tcherepnin v.

2 The court explained that it spoke in terms of what a
jury could find because it was reviewing a grant of summary
j\!dgment.
"We do not imply that absent some issue o ff'at t raised
by~ defendant the issue should not be decided as a matter of
law." A-7, note 3.
3The CA acknowledged that a fact-finder could decide in
favor of Marine Bank on this issue if it determined that use of
the barn and pasture was the primary purpose of the transaction .

.

.

-5Knight, 389

u.s.

332 (1967), the Court held that withdrawable

capital shares in a savings and loan association were
securities.

Although Tcherepnin is not controlling, it is

difficult to distinguish long-term deposit transactions with
institutions such as the savings and loan in Tcherepnin from
similar deposit transactions with banks.

Furthermore, the SEC

has taken the position that certificates of deposit issued by
banks are securities.4
Judge Weis dissented, stating:

(1)

The transaction between

the Weavers and the Piccirillos did not create a security, since
the arrangement did not involve multiple investors, use of a
public market, or a public offering.

This type of transaction

should be regulated under state law.

(2)

deposit was not a security.

The certificate of

Tcherepnin is not on point.

The

shares involved in that case entitled the holders to a share of
the profits and they were transferrable.

A certificate of

deposit is more like a savings account than it is like a bank's
capital stock.

See Bellah v. First National Bank of Hereford,

495 F.2d 1109 (CAS 1974)

(CA rejected various arguments

plaintiffs made to support their contention that a certificate of
deposit is a security, yet it permitted plaintiffs to pursue the

4 The CA also held that the pledge of the certificate of
deposit constituted a "sale" of a security.
TheCA concluded the opinion by remarking that the DC's
opinion displayed a "general tone of nostalgia for the days when
victims of fraud were relegated to the common-law remedy of
deceit." The CA asserted that the federal courts "ought to
interpret the 1934 Act with a presumption of coverage of any
transaction which Congress did not expressly exclude."

-6issue on remand); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v.
Fingland, 615 F.2d 465

(CA7 1980)

(CA held that the allegations

of the complaint did not establish that the certificate of
deposit involved in that case was a security).
First American Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673

But see SEC v.
(CAS 1973)

(certificates of investment and savings accounts characterized as
"securities").

The ALI's proposed Federal Securities Code

specifically excludes from the definition of "security" a "bank
certificate of deposit that ranks on a parity with an interest in
a deposit account with the bank."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends:

(1)

An FDIC-insured non-

---- ---

equity certificate of deposit, bearing a fixed rate of interest
'-·

--

and issued by a commercial ban.k.,- is not a "security," as defined
~

in the 1933 Act or the 19·34 Act.

The CA's decision conflicts

with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland,
supra, and Bellah v. First National Bank of Hereford, supra.
~~

Although the SEC has taken the position that certificates of

~~~ deposit
~

issued by banks are securities, there is nothing in the

language or the legislative history of the 1933 or 1934 Acts to
support this position.

The Glass-Steagall Act generally

prohibits banks from underwriting, buying, or selling equity
securities.

Under the CA3's decision, many commercial banks

would be violating the Glass-Steagall Act by accepting
certificates of deposit.

TheCA erred in relying on Tcherepnin,

supra, for the shares at issue in that case were withdrawable
capital shares that carried a right to vote and were not entitled
to a fixed rate of return.

The certificate of deposit involved

-7in this case carried no voting rights, paid a fixed rate of
interest, ana oio not represent shares in the bank.
(2)

The written agreement between the Piccirillos ana the

weavers oio not constitute a "security" under the 1933 or the
1934 Act.

This was a private arrangement between two married

individuals.

Mr. weaver oio not pool his investment with anyone,

ana there was no public offering or advertising.

The CA thus

misapplied the criteria for a "security" under the 1933 Act, as
set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328

u.s.

293, 301 (1946), ana

as extended to the 1934 Act in Tcherepnin, supra.

Furthermore,

Marine Bank could not have acted with scienter with respect to
this agreement, since it hao no knowlege of the agreement.
Resps reply:

(1)

Resps oo not argue that the original

purchase of the certificate of deposit from Marine Bank
constituted a purchase of a security under the 1933 or 1934 Act.
Rather, they argue that the exchange of the certificate of
deposit, by way of the pledge, for investment purposes
constituted a sale of a security under the 1933 ana 1934 Acts.S
Since this was an investment transaction rather than a
traditional commercial banking transaction, the CA's holding will
have little effect on the banking industry.
(2)

Although petr contends that the written agreement was

5 Resps also assert that the Court's recent decision in
Rubin v. United States disposes of the first question presenteo-"namely that the pledge of the Certificate of Deposit for the
loan constitutes the purchase and sale of a security under the
Securities Acts." However, petr ooes~rgue in the cert petn that
the pledge was not a sale.
n t

..

'

.

-8not an investment contract, petr does not challenge the CA's
alternative holding that the agreement could be considered a
certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing
agreement.

In this case, there was a pooling of Weaver's capital

with Piccirillo's equipment and labor, and Weaver's return on his
investment was contingent upon this combination of capital and
labor producing profits.

A "security" may be involved even if

there is no public offering or advertising.

See,

~'

Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972).
(3) The CA did not suggest that petr could be held liable
without proof of scienter.

Weaver is not claiming that the bank

acted negligently, but rather that it intentionally defrauded him
out of his $50,000 certificate of deposit.
4.

DISCUSSION:

I recommend a CFR SG to explore the issue

of whether a certificate of deposit may be considered a
"security."

I agree with petr that Tcherepnin is easily

distinguishable, since the securities involved in Tcherepnin were
capital shares that were transferrable, carried the right to
vote, and entitled the holder to a share of the savings and loan
association's profits.

The Court emphasized that the holders of

these shares were not entitled to a fixed rate of return.
U.S., at 337.

389

I do not understand resps' argument that even if

this certificate of deposit was not a "security" when purchased,
it was a security when it was pledged.
I am less troubled by the CA's holding that the written

-9-

agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos could be viewed
as creating a "security."

The CA concluded that a trier of fact

could regard this as a profit-sharing arrangement, since the
Piccirillos provided the labor, the Weavers essentially provided
working capital, and in return the Weavers acquired an interest
in the future profits of the business.
There is a response.
5/18/81
ME

Peterson

Opinion in
Petition

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. C. § 77b( I):
(I) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in an
rofit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust ~preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"'security", or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing .
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(IO):
(I 0) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing;
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.

'-'VUTJ,

Argued . .. . . . . .
Submitted
· · · · · · · · · · ·, 19 . ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 19 . . .

r
utt
Assigned
. ... · · · · · · · · · · · · · . ,
u~ ~ u

1., .. .

Announce~· .. . . ······· · ···., 19 .. .

No. 80 1562

.... .. ..... ... .. , 19

MARINE BANK
vs.

WEAVER

N OT VOTI NG

~

J/. ;jsjzz_

-~~~
""-"'

meb 01/08/82 ~ ~

- /7c.A-

C! J4 -"3

Cf>S'...

~, ~~ ~

"'" I

BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

January 8, 1982

Mary

No. 80-1562, Marine Bank v. Samuel and Alice Weaver (

CJI ~ -

w......._

~

Questions Presented

--

-

The major question is whether a certificate of derosit is a
security subject to the anti-fraud provision of the Securities and
Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934

-

~

it is pledged to the issueE as

collateral for a guarantee of a loan.

The other question is whether

<.

2.

a unique agreement between the guarantors and the borrowers is a
security under the Act, and, if so, whether, on the facts of this
case, the Bank is liable for fraud in the sale of that security.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Facts and Proceedings Below
Because of the procedural posture of the case (the DC

granted summary judgment against the pltfs), I will present the
facts

(briefly) according to pltfs'

(resps) view of

t~f

Between 1976 and 1978, petr Marine Bank had loaned $33,000
in demand loans to Columbus Packing Co.

(Columbus)

(a slaughterhouse

and retail meat store owned and operated by Raymond and Barbara
Piccirillo)

Because of the Bank's failure to perfect its security

interest in Columbus' assets, it did not have a secured position as
of Mar. 17, 1878.

All loans were overdue on Jan. 16, 1978, and

Columbus was unable to make any interest or principal payments on
that date or thereafter.

In addition, Columbus's checking account

was overdrawn by $7,758.77 (this account had been overdrawn almost
constantly since Apr., 1977, with an average overdraft of $9,000).

.&-.._._

In order to reduce its exposure, the Bank first tried to
get the Small Business Administration to loan Columbus money.

When

this fell through, the Bank approached the weavers (who had recently
~

.....

purchased a 5-year $50,000 CD from the Bank) and suggested that they
guarantee a loan of $65,000 to the Piccirillos to improve their
working capital-position.

In 1978, Sam and Alice Weaver were

retired farmers, with eighth grade educations, 78 and 71 years old
':::
~
respectively. The Bank's representative stated that with their

.~·

..

3.

the Bank would offer a $65,000· loan to Columbus,
substantially all of which would go to the business as working
The weavers were never told that Columbus was indepted to
the Bank or that Columbus had any serious financial problems.
....
Bank did tell the Weavers that there was little risk in their

The

guarantee, that the bank had perfected security interests in
Columbus' equipment and working capital and that the value of this
collateral was enough to protect the Bank and the Weavers.
In reliance on these representations, the Weavers entered

~~

into an agreement with the Picirrillos, to which the Bank was not a

~

party.

In return for the guarantee, the Weavers were given the

w~following

rights: (l) use of the barn and pasture on the

slaughterhouse premises; (2) 50% of the "adjusted net profits" of
Columbus Packing so long as the Weavers remained co-obligors; (3)
$100 a month until the loan was repaid; and (4) veto of any future
loans to Columbus.

According to the weaver's own tesimony, they

never told the Bank about agreement, which was prepared by the
Picirillos' lawyer and signed at ~Weavers' house shortly before
March 17, 1978.
On March 17, 1978, the weavers pledged their CD to the Bank
and the Bank loaned Columbus $65,000.

Of that amount, $42,515.37

went to cover the loans and overdrafts held by the Bank itself, most
of the rest went directly from the Bank to trade creditors and to
the IRS.

Only $3,833.06 was available to Columbus for working

capital.

The Bank never had any reasonable expectation that the

loan would be repaid by Columbus.

On May 9, Columbus closed its

business due to lack of capital; it filed

r bankruptcy in July.

wuw-'
4

4.

The Bank refuses to return the CD to

th~

Weavers and concedes that

foreclosure is inevitable.

-

On May 4, 1979, the weavers filed a complaint in , DC.

They

claimed that the Bank had violated Pa. securities law, the common
law of fraud, and federal rule lOb-5

(enforcing SEA §lOb) in

connection with the sale or purchase of two securities, the CD and
the Weaver-Picarrillo agreement (the W-P agreement).
On Jan. 11, 1980, the DC (Willson) dismissed the action.
It held that neither the pledged CD nor the W-P agreement was a
security for purposes of the federal security laws.

The pendant

state claims were dismissed because the DC could "find no subject
matter juisdiction [over the federal claims] under the statute
involved."
The CA3 (Gibbons & Sloviter)

_.. . .

(Weis dissenting) reversed,

. ___

-=-

holding that both the CD and the W-P agreement were securities.

The

CA also reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims, so that, on
remand, the DC could decide whether they should be tried with the
federal claims.
The propriety of the remand of the pendant claims is not
included in the questions on which cert was granted.
estions presented are:

The two

was the pledge of the CD the pledge of a

for purposes of §lO(b) liability?

was the W-P agreement a

security and, if so, can the Bank be held liable for fraud in its
sale to the Weavers?

B.

The Regulatory Framework
In March of 1933, President Roosevelt sent to Congress the

5.
bill that was to become the Securities Act of 1933.

At that time,

he expressed the view that bank regulation should be embodied in
separate legislation.

See 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933).

Shortly

thereafter, a Senate resolution authorized the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency to continue its investigations of the practices
of companies engaged in "the business of banking" and companies
engaged in the securities business.
Sess.

(1933).

S. Res. 56, 73rd Cong., 1st

As a result of these and earlier investigations,

Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, 15
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

u.s.c.

u.s.c.

§77a et seq.,

78a et seq., and the

Banking Act of 1933 (commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act) . 1
As the Court pointed out

u.s.

425

185 (1976)

in ~rnst

& Ernst v. Hochfelder,

(Powell, J.), the securities acts were intended

to protect investors against fraud and manipulation of stock prices
by (1) regulating transactions in the securities exchanges and in
the over-the-counter

markets~

(2) imposing specified civil

liabilities to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing~

and

(3) imposing reporting requirements applicable to

companies whose stock is listed on the national securities
exchanges.

Id., at 195 (citing H. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st

Sess., 1-5 (1933) and S. Rep. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5
(1934).

In contrast, the Glass-Steagall Act focused on the

interests of depositors and provided a comprehensive scheme of
regulation over many aspects of the operation and management of

1 48 Stat. 162, codified in various sections of title 12 of

u.s.c.

.

!'" .

-

6.

banking institutions.

t1f

'

.

Initially, all the federal regulators apparently assumed
1\
that the securities acts did not apply to bank deposits, including
CDs.

-

By 1966, however, the SEC, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the

Currency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Federal Reserve

""

,,

-

System, all seem to have agreed that even savings deposits were
securities covered by the acts. See FDIC, Statement of Policy on
'~-.....--..
Advertising for Funds by Insured State Nonmember Banks, 31 Fed. Reg.
16,581 (1966) • 2 But by 1974, the FDIC and the SEC wre filing

-

opposing briefs in cases involving CDs issued by state-chartered
federally insured (and regulated) banks, with the FDIC arguing that
the securities acts did not apply.

SG brief at 2, n.l.

1976, the Comptroller was agreeing with the FDIC.

Id.

And by
These

disagreements were resolved in preparing the brief of the government
to this Court in this case.
•t

The new unanimous position of the

,,

-..

~~

executive is that deposits, including CDs, of federally-insured (and

7
/

therefore federally-regulated) banking institutions are not
securities
at the time of issue.
..
~

Despite the varying views of the executive, the courts seem
· to have generally assumed that bank savings accounts are equivalent
to currency and not securities for purposes of the securities acts.
See Burrus, Cootes & MacKethan, 567 F. 2d 1262, 1264 (CA4 1976).
2This interpretation seems to have initiated with the SEC,
possibly in response to increased bank advertising for deposits
during the sixties. Those advertisements were regarded as
misleading; items such as interest rates and whether or not rates
were compounded daily or monthly were not always clearly and simply
stated.

·~

~~~-~~
lAA-~~

7.

The question before the Court is whether a bank CD is a deposi
account or a security.

Most of the lower courts considering the

question have held that certificates of deposit issued by federally
regulated banks are not securities.

See cases collected in SG's

brief n.32, at 20.

II.

DISCUSSION
Is a CD a Security?

A.

1.
history.

The language of the statute and its legislative

,,,, a....t-

Section 3(a) (10) of the SEA, 15

u.s.c. §78c(a), provides

that:
"When used in this chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires ••.
(1)) the term 'security' means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate -o f depos i t, f or a
security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as
a 'security '; or any' certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of
not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited."
Congress
included every item that, in the view of the legislators,
___.
might be thought to be a security and added a catchall phrase to
cover exotic or unusual transactions or anything that might be
invented later with the same characteristics or possibilities for
abuse that known securities had.
1st Sess. 11 (1933).

I

'1:

~·

See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong.,

At that time, certificates of deposit were a

8.
known and common part of the banking business.

A federal statute

had explicitly authorized their issuance by banks since 1913.
Federal Reserve Act §19, 38 Stat. 270.

Congress' failure to include

this known commodity by its common name suggests that Congress did

~

---

not consider CDs securities.

--------Congress

security."

did include "certificates of deposit, for a

Thus, the statute included receipts of the CD-type, but

only for items already securities. 3

A bank deposit is not a receipt

for a security--it is a receipt for an unpaid balance of money or
its equivalent, 12

u.s.c.

§1813, and money is not a security.

A CD

is merely one form of savings (not investment) device available

for {~

bank depositors (not investors).
The legislative history shows affirmatively that Congress

bank within the term "securities."

At the House Hearings, in

response to a question from Representative Mapes relating to the
coverage of the proposed §3(a), quoted above, defining "security."
Huston Thompson, one of the draftsmen of the bill, explained that
while the bill would encompass "any kind of a security of a national
bank," he did not suppose a national bank would be putting out
anything in addition to its capital stock."

Federal Securities Act:

Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1933).

3 This type of receipt was commonly used in corporate
reorganizations. See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 460, 462 (2d ed.
1961).

9.

There is also evidence that, iri considering the bill that
became the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA), Congress viewed
the economic interests of depositors as distinct from those of
investors, and it was the interest of investors that received
special protection under the securities laws.

During the Senate

hearings, Senator Adams, a member of the Banking and Currency Comm.,
and Algbert Wiggin, a witness and former banker, emphasized that
safety of principal was far less a problem for depositors than
investors.

Stock Exchange Practicers: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S.

Res. 56 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 2426-2427 (1934) •
Moreover, the Glass-Steagall Act, enacted on June 16, 1933,
provided that it was illegal for any entity engaged in the business
of selling, issuing, underwriting, or distributing "securities, to
engage at the same time in the business of receiving deposits
subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request
of the debtor."
§378(a).

Act §21 (a) (1), current version at 12

u.s.c.

This provision was enacted a mere 19 days after the

passage of the Securities Act of 1933, which has a definition of
security virtually identical to the the definition in the 1934 SEA
whose meaning is at issue in the case at bar.

This suggests that

Congress both knew how to say CD when it meant CD and that CDs are
not securities--if they were, it would be illegal for banks to
engage in the business of issuing them.
Given the wording of the definition of "security" and the
legislative history of the acts, it seems fairly likely that a CDs

10.
were not included when Congress used

th~

term "security."

This

result receives further support from the decsions of this Court
considering whether various interests are securities and the
decisions of the CAs on the status of both CDs and on notes.

2.

S. Ct. caselaw.

In the past, the Court has interpreted

the word "security" to refer to an investment in a for-profit
enterprise run by another.
to the case at bar.

Three S. Ct. cases are of most relevance

In Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389

u.s.

332 (1967)

(Brennan, J.), the Court held that a withdrawable capital share in a
state-chartered savings and loan (S & L) was a security.

Under Ill.

law, the holders of the shares were members of the S & L ass'n and
entitled to vote on ass'n matters, much like shareholders in regular
corporations.

Id., at 336.

The holders of these shares were not

entitled to a fixed rate of return, but instead were entitled to
whatever dividends might be declared from time to time by the Board
of Directors.

Id., at 337.

The S & L was uninusred, so

shareholders stood to lose any money they had in the S & L in the
event of insolvency.

And the legislative history, discussed above,

suggested that the shares were securities because it indicates that
Thompson, one of the drafters, expected national banks to issue
securities in the form of capital stock--items quite similar to the
S & L's (withdrawable) capital shares.

~ -1; l,
•

•"()fS (

.J~

' 1 rvt1V'-

Although, to an S & L "depositor," withdrawable capital

shares may be functionally equivalent to a bank deposit or CD,
Tcherepnin does not control the case at bar.
purchase anything similar to a share of stock.

The weavers did not
They had no right to

7

11.
vote.

They contracted for a fixed rate 'of return over a fixed

period of time.

Marine Bank is insured by the FDIC so that in the

event of insolvancy, a substantial amount of their funds would be
recoverable.

And the legislative history suggests that a CD is not

a security; Thompson thought that capital shares were the only
securities banks would be issuing.

In~ited

(1975)

Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421

u.s.

837

(Powell, J.), the Court held that shares in a cooperative

apartment were not securities.

The Court noted that the purchasers

of apartments were required to buy 18 shares of stock for each room
at a cost of $25.

A tennant terminating occupancy was required to

offer his stock to the cooperative for $25.

The Court explained

that these shares
"lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the most common
feature of stock: the right to receive 'dividends
contingent upon an apportionment of profits.'
389 u.s.,
at 339. Nor do they possess the other characteristics
traditionally associated with stock: they are not
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothicated' they
confer no voting rights in proportion to to the number of
shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value.
In
short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire
subs ~ zed low-cost living space; it was not to invest in
profit." Id., at 851.
The Court stressed that the key attribute of a security is the
presence of an investment in a common venture motivated by a

~~-------------~-----------~--------~
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived solely from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.

,,

Id., at 851. 4

4 The ~ lassie formulation of the test for a security was given
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). There, the
Court explained that the basic test is "whether the scheme involves
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others."
See also Teamsters v. Daniels,
Footnote continued on next page.
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Under this test, the CD would not appear to be a security.
It represents an amount deposited with the bank, returning a set
amount of interest, with minimal risk, rather than an investment in
a common enterprise subject to the risks of gain and loss of the
enterprise.

3.

Relevant decisions of the CAs.

At least two CAs 5 have

considered this question--whether bank CDs issued by federally
insured banks are securities--in addition to the CA below: the CA4,

& CA7.
(a).

The CA4.

In Burrus, Cootes and Burrus v. MacKethan,

537 F. 2d 1262, withdrawn as moot, 545 F. 2d 13SS (CA4 1976), cert
denied, 434 u.s. S26 (1977), the CA4 held that "certificates of
investment" issued by a savings and loan are not securities within
the meaning of the acts.

Under state law, savings and loans were

allowed to issue such certificates, and the certificates were (under

439 U.S. 551 (197S) (Powell, J.) (holding that employees' interests
in a pension plan are not securities).
5 see also SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 2S9 F. Supp.
3, 31-33 (SDNY 1968), aff'd, 435 F. 2d 510 (CA2 1970) (CD not a
security for purposes of the Investment Company Act); Bellah v.
First National Bank of Herefore, 495 F. 2d 1109 (CAS 1974). In
Bellah, the pltfs argued that CDs issued by a bank was a security.
The court noted that a certificate of deposit (issued in exchange
for currency) is not a "certificate of deposit, for a security." On
the basis of the arguments presented to it, the CA concluded that a
CD is not a securtiy, though it remanded for further development of
this point, as the DC had not addressed it.
The CAS has held that CDs of non-federally regulated (noninsured) state banking institutions are securities. SEC v. First
American Bank and Trust Co., 4Sl F. 2d 673, 677 (CAS 1973).

13.

~

state law) regarded as equivalent to CDs issued by banks.

The

relation created by the certificate was debtor-creditor: the bank
was liable to pay back the money at a certain time and at a certain
interest rate.
The CA4 regarded this certificate as "not distinguishable
in any significant way from a pass-book issued by a savings bank,
and it is hardly arguable that savings bank account books are
securities rather than the equivalent of currency."

Ibid.

The

court also relied on (1) the fact that the definition of "security"
includes "certificates of deposit, for a security," but not
certificates of deposit and (2) the fact that if certificates of
deposit were securities, "there would be superimposed upon an
already existing pattern of federal or state banking or like
regulations •.. a further, and perhaps not wholly suitable, pattern
of regulations by the SEC."

(b).

CA7.

Id., at 1265.

In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co.

v. Fingland, 615 F. 2d 465 (CA7 1980), the pltfs argued that trust
funds were invested by Bahamian banking and trust entity, as
trustee, in its own CD, whose terms and conditions were not
described by pltfs.

The Court held that the pltfs had failed to

show the existence of a security, relying, like the CA4, on the
inclusion of the words "certificate of deposit, for a security," and
the absence of "security of deposit."

The court also applied the

"investment-in-an-enterprise" test developed by the Court and
discussed above.

The CA also noted that under the 1933 Glass-

Steagall Act, 6 as discussed above, it is unlawful for any person or

Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.

lo.

\>1
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organization to engage in issuing securities and at the same time
engage in banking operations, such as issuing certificates of
deposit.

(c).

The CA3 below.

The CA3 (Gibbons & Sloviter) reasoned

that, although Tcherepnin (holding withdrawable capital shares in an
S & L a security) was not controlling, "functionally, from the
depositor's standpoint, it is hard to distinguish long term deposit
transactions with mutual institutions from similar deposit
transactions with banks operated for the profit of stockholders."
The court also relied heavily on the fact that when Tcherepnin was
written, the SEC, FDIC, et al., unanimously agreed that deposit and
share accounts of banks were securities for purposes of the fraud
provisons of the securities acts, a position maintained before the
CA3 below by the SEC (though now abandoned) •

The CA3 thought the

Tcherepnin Court must have been aware of the agencies' position and
somehow (silently) depended on it in reaching its decision.

The CA3

held that a CD is the functional equivalent of a corporation's bond
or note and therefore a security.

4.

Relevant decisions of the CAs on the status of notes.

In concluding that a CD was a security because it was equivalent to
corporate bonds and notes, the CA3 ignored the fact that the lower
courts 7 have not treated all notes as securities. Instead, the

6Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, §21, 48 Stat. 189, current
version at 12 u.s.c. §378(a) (1).
Footnote(s) 7 will appear on following pages.
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lower courts have tried to distinguish between those notes that are
truely investments in the borrower--the prototypical example being
bonds and notes traded in the securities market, with the interest
rate varying with the investment risk--and a pure "loan," usually
referred to as a "commercial note." 8

The lower courts have adapted

the factors developed by this Court in cases such as Forman, and
have attempted to determine whether the lender should be considered
an investor in a joint enterprise, subject to the risks of success
and failure, or a purely commercial lender, lending for interest
with minimal risk and relatively indifferent to the success of the

7The Court has never considered a case dealing with whether a
debt instrument is a security.
, __
8 The "commercial-investment" distinction has developed in the
CAS and the CA7. See Sonnenschien, Antifraud Provisions of Note
Transactions, 35 Business Lawyer 1567, 1589-1596 (1980). The CA9
has adopted a variation, under which the focus is whether the lender
has generated risk capital. These approaches have been criticized
as un r ab
id., at 1589-1605.
udge Prien y as joined in this criticism, and would start
the presump 'on that a note is a security (because "note" is
ed in t
language of the definition), but would allow the
issuer o s ow that this note is not a security. His examples of
notes that are not securities are:
"the note delivered in consumer financing, the note
secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note
secured by a lien on a small business or some of its
assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank
customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of
accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an
open-account dept incurred in the ordinary course of
business
" Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross &
Co., 544 F. 2d 1126, 1138 (CA2 1976).
The American Law Institute would codify the "mercantileinvestment dichotomy that is emerging as the least imperfect
solution to a troublesome problem." American Law Institute, Federal
Securities Code--Proposed official Draft, at 159 (1978).
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enterprise.

A fully collateralized loari is usually not an

investment.
Even if the CD had "note" instead of CD stamped on it, 9 it
would not be a security.

It does not represent an investment in

Marine Bank, but rather a deposit of unneeded money with the bank to
be re-paid at a set interest rate with little risk.

..

~

~

/

4.

The SG's position.

The SG has taken the position that

the CD issued to the weavers is not a CD--but he's not so sure about
others.

The SG suspects that a CD issued by a non-federally

~z~ regulated institution might be a
f ./
/ vY ading of CDs "in the secondary

~&tJ~ situation.

security.

He also feels that the

,,.

~

market" might present a different

And he maintains that a

co

should be considered a

~il~

security for purposes of the 1940 Investment co. Act, though the

__ ~ ~

definition of security in that act is identical to that in the SEA
(1934).
The SG's position

between

the various regulators--it certainly is not the result of logic or
rational analysis.

The SEC apparently wants to maximize its

jurisdiction, but is willing to concede that where the FDIC and the

9 The SG maintains that CDs "could be found to fall within th[e
literal] definitional language, •••• " SG brief at 10. The SG
begins this argument by noting that the 1934 act's definition (the
relevant one) includes the terms "note" and "debenture." And the
Court has construed the 1934 definition as "virtually identical" to
the 1933 definintion. And the 1933 definition includes "any
evidence of indebtedness:"
Thus, concludes the SG, a CD could be
considered within the literal language of the definition, not just
the catch-all.

17.
other federal banking regulatory
leave matters in their hands.

agenci~s · have

jurisdiction, it will

It "follows" that the only CD that is

definitely not a security is a CD issued by a federally insured bank
that has not been traded in a secondary market.
The proposition that bank CDs are securities for purposes
of the Investment Co. Act of 1940 (though not under the securities
acts of 1933 and 1934}, should be rejected.

The basis for this

argument is that the Investment Co. Act applies only to companies
with more than 40% of their assets in securities.
Act §3(a} (3}, 15

u.s.c. 80a-3(a} (3}.

Investment Co.

If CDs are not securities,

money market funds (which hold approximately 22.9% of their assets
in CDs} will be able to evade the Investment Co. Act by holding 40%
of their assets in non-securities.

This would be bad, explains the

SG, because the relationship between a money market fund and its
shareholders is identical to the relationship between an investment
company and its shareholders.
The major problem with this argument is that Congress
provided that the Investment Co. Act applies to an entity engaged in
investing or reinvesting only if it "owns or proposes to acquire
securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and
cash items} on an unconsolidated basis."

For other companies, the

registration and disclosure provisions of the SEA apply.
§12(g} (2} (b), §78_!_(g} (2} (b).

SEA

Given this definition of the scope of

the Investment Co. Act, one suspects that Congress would not have
wanted it to apply to money-market funds just because the
relationship between their shareholders and the company is the same

18.

as the relationship between the sharehoiders of other investment
companies and their shareholders.
The distinction Congress regarded as determinative is the
amount of a company's holdings in cash or cash-like holdings
relative to its holdings in securities, with their higher risk.
Congress did not include gov't securities and cash items (low risk
items) as securities in determining whether 40% of a company's
assets were securities.

And CDs and other deposit instruments are

usually regarded as essentially cash items, and, in terms of risk,
are certainly more like cash than like securities.

In effect, the

SG is arguing for the removal of the 40% limit on the Investment Co.
Act's applicability, substituting for it a new standard: the Act
applies to any company whose relation with its shareholders is like
that of an investment company.
In addition, it is most unlikely that Congress used the
same definition of "security" in 1934 in the SEA and in 1940 in the
Investment Co. Act, but meant different things.
The SG's qualification that CDs issued by non-federally
regulated

(as opposed to those of federally regulated) entities

might be CDs is similarly unprincipled.

There is certainly nothing

in the legislative history or language of the statute to suggest
that whether the issuer is a federally regulated entity is relevant
to whether an item is a security.

If Congress did not intend, as a

general matter, to regulate all banks under the securities acts--and
if it deliberately did not extend federal banking regulation to all
banks--Congress presumably thought that the states themselves could
manage to regulate their own banks.

Congress' failure to regulate

19.
certain entities under one statute should · not, in itself, create a
presumption that it meant to regulate them under another statute
generally applicable to quite different entities and not applicable
to similar entities subject to direct federal regulation.
Turning to the secondary market distinction, see n. 40 in
SG's brief, the idea here seems to be that an interest that is not a
security at the time of issue might become one in a subsequent
transaction.

In effect, the SG is trying to change the

jurisdictional coverage of the securities acts from one determined
by reference to the type of instrument to one determined by the
identity of the seller on a transaction-by-transaction basis (not a
security unless this seller is already subject to pervaisive federal
regulation).

This is a fairly radical rewriting of the securities

acts, which, by their terms, apply to purchases and sales (and
registration, etc.) of securities.

Thus, the pledge of the CD to

Marine Bank was not the pledge of a security; the CD was not a
security when it was pledged because it was not a security when
issued and nothing happened between issuance and pledge to change
its nature.

here is whether the W-P agreement is an
investment agreement.

As discussed in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328

U.S. 293, 301 (1946), and other cases of this Court discussed above,

----

---

the key question is whether there is an investment of money in a
-------~~

common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.

-------.

Here, in return for guaranteeing the loan, the Weavers

20.
received the following:

(1) use of the barn and pasture on the

slaughterhouse premises: (2) 50% of the "adjusted net profits" of
Columbus Packing so long as the Weavers remained co-obligors:

(3)

$100 a month until loan repaid: and (4) veto of any future loans to
Columbus.

The Weavers maintain that the Bank induced them to sign

-

==-

the pledge by telling them that the value of the Bank's collateral
was sufficient to cover its interest and theirs and that there was
little risk in the arrangement.
7.

See Brief of Weavers (red) n.lO at

On the other hand, Mr. Weaver testified that they intended to

"invest" in Columbus and to receive "a little share in the business,
if he made any profits: he was giving us a little share in his
business if we'd loan him a little working capital."

Id., at 17

n.l8.

~ Giagreement

Two questions are presented by this issue.

First, is the

an investment (and therefore a security)?

Second, is it

possible the Bank can be held liable for fraud in connection with
the agreement, to which it was not a party and of which it knew
nothing?
1.

Is the agreement a security?

There are several ways in

which this aspect of the case could be disposed of.

One would be to

remand for further factual development on whether this was an
investment.

On the other hand, Judge Weis, dissenting below, noted

that the Howey test, affirmed by this Court in Forman, requires "an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others."
(emphasis

added). ~ noted

Forman,

~21

u.s.,

at 852

that the Weaver's profits were

not to come "solely~jn the efforts of others since the "profits"

c /,L,:,_. ~.... ...r..f' ....,._.~

.

''

'-'.t«-4-<., .
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included the right to use the Piccirilld's pasture and barn.

In

addition, Judge Weis understood "common enterprise" as meaning
something more than a face to face encounter between two
individuals.

When all the parties involved deal directly with each

other, the transaction is simply not the type of market transaction
the securities laws were designed to regulate.

Judge Weis approved

the CA7's requirement that a common enterprise must include both
multiple investors and a pooling of their funds.

See Hird v. AgriReasearch Council, Inc., 561 F. 2d 96, 100 (CA7 1977) . 10 The issue
~

of whether a unique agreement between two individuals can be a
seems to be just emerging, and there is little law on the
point.

--------~

I find both of Judge Weis' points persuasive.
~---------------~~

-- --

The ability

to use the land and barn suggests a transaction more like a lease
than a true investment--the value of that ability would not depend
on the efforts of others or the degree of success of the enterprise.
To the extent the guarantee was in exchange for use of the land and
barn, it was not an investment at all.

In Howey and the other cases

articulating the Howey rule with its "solely" requirement, the Court
has indicated that a transaction must be solely an investment before

10 The CA7 position that a contract between with a "unitary
nature" is not a security seems to have originated in Milnarid v. MP Commodities, Inc., 457 F. 2d 274, 277 (CA7 1972) (Duffy, Kerner, &
v John Paul Stevens, Circuit Judges).
The American Law Institute's proposed code includes a provision
that investment contracts are securities only if an offering or
distribution has been made pursuant to an offering statement or
distribution statement. American Law Institute, Federal Securities
Code--Proposed Official Draft, at 158 (1978).
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it will be considered a security.
On the second point, if an agreement between two

-

individuals can be a security, rule lOb-5 may soon apply to all

--

contracts in which one side can argue that it expects to
contracted-for benefit from the profits of the other party's
enterprise.

Individually-negotiated, unique, contracts are

certainly not the types of arrangements Congress had in mind when it
attemped to protect investors by regulating the securities markets.

2.

Can the Bank be held liable for fraud in connection

with this second security?

The Weavers themselves testified (in

affidavits) that they did not tell the Bank about the W-P agreement.
And various Bank officers testified (in affidavits) that they knew
nothing about the agreement.

The agreement was prepared by

Piccirillo's attorney and delivered by the Piccirillos to the Weaver
home, where the four of them negotiated certain changes and signed
it.

It is likely that the Bank did not know about the agreement.
The DC concluded that the Bank could not, therefore, be

held liable on a secondary-liability theory for aidding and abetting
(aidding and abetting fraud in connection with the sale fo this
security) because it did not know of the "security."

And the DC

rejected the notion that the Bank could not be held liable for
failure to disclose the debtor's status, noting that there was no
such duty under state law.
But the weavers did not just accuse the Bank of failure to
disclose.

They accused it of affirmative acts constituting fraud:
. '·
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There is, therefore, no need for an aidding and abetting theory.
Moreover, even if the Bank did not know about the agreement, it must
have known that the Weavers were getting something out of the deal.
Given the opportunity to present their case in a trial (i.e.,
assuming the W-P agreement is a security), the Weavers might be able
to show that the Bank knew, or should have known, that as a result
of the Bank's fruadulent statements to the Weavers, the Weavers were
purchasing some kind of security from the Picirillos.

If such a

showing were made, I do not see why the Bank should not be liable.

\

~ you

consider the W-P agreement a security, it would be

appropriate to remand for trial on whether the Bank can be held
liable for the weavers' loss.

C.

The Pendant Claims
This case (viewing the facts most favorably to the weavers)

vV

~ is really very sad.

The Weavers argue that if federal courts do not

consider their claims, they may be out of court.

They explain that

they filed an action in state court "by way of summons which was not
served in reliance upon the federal court resolving the controversy.
Any further prosecution of this claim in state court now may well be
barred by a two year statute of limitations."

-----7

42 n.30.

I don't understand this at all.

Resp brief (red), at

Why file something in

state court in such a way that it does you no good?

Moreover, at

the time the DC dissmissed this action (Jan. 11, 1980), the 2-year
statute had not run--the contract was signed Mar. 17, 1978.

The

Weavers' lawyers had over 2 months in which to file something

~ effective

in state court after it was clear that they might not get

24.
anywhere in federal court (which they should have suspected from the
beginning).
The CA remanded the pendant claims to the DC to consider
whether they should be tried with the federal ones.

This aspect of

theCA's decision was not challenged in the cert petn, but if the
Court holds that neither the CD nor the W-P agreement is a security,
there is no point in remanding for the DC's consideration of only
the pendant claims.

In United Mine workers v. Gibbs, 383

u.s.

715

(1966), the Court held that it was proper to consider state-law
claims based on the same facts as a federal claim, but added that if
the federal claim were is dismissed before trial, "certainly .•. the
state claims should be dismissed as well."

If the remand consists

only of the pendant claims, the DC will simply dismiss them
automatically.
If either the CD or the W-P agreement is a security, there
will be a remand for trial.

In that event, the state-law claims

should also be remanded for the DC to consider whehter they should
be tried together with the federal claims, a question the DC did not
address because it dismissed all the federal claims prior to trial.

CONCLUSION
The major question is whether a

ban~

within the meaning of that term in the SEA.

CD is a security
The language of the

statute, its legislative, and the decisions of this Court suggest
that it is not.

A security is an investment whereby an investor

places his capital at the risk of an enterprise in the hope of
profiting thereby solely from the skills and efforts of others.

·'\

A
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CD is simply a deposit of money in a ban'k · for safekeeping, at a set
interest rate, with minimal risk.

Such deposits are subject to

regulation under the Glass-Steagall Act, not the securities acts.
The next question is whether the W-P agreement is a
security.

I would argue that it is not a security because it is a

unique, individually-negotiated agreement (a contract) between two
individuals: as such it fails to meet the developing requirements
for finding an intent to invest in a "common en-terprise."
'-..,

Moreover,

'-,

it is not a security because the weavers received ihe right to use
land and a barn, and did not, therefore, expect to profit solely
from the efforts of others.
A holding that neither the CD nor W-P agreement is a }
security would be consistent with the ALI's proposed federal
securities code.ll
If you consider the W-P agreement a security, then it is
necessary to consider whether it is possible that, at a trial, the
Weavers could establish a basis for holding the Bank liable.
Viewing the facts most favorably for the Weavors, a remand is

11 The American Law Institute has published a proposed official
draft of a federal securitis code (Mar. 15, 1978). The definition
of security is essentially the same as in the securities acts, but
the proposal also includes a section excluding certain interests
from the term. Most of the exclusions are the codification of
caselaw. Securities do not include consumer or commercial loans or
bank deposits or ens. And certificates of interest, investment
contracts, and fractional undivided inter~ts in mineral rights are
securities only if the "interest or instrument is of a class that
was the subject of an offering statement or a distribution
statement!' American Law Institute, Federal securities Code-Proposed Official Draft, at 157-158 (1978).

,.
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appropriate because they might be able to · show that the Bank
deliberately mis-led them knowing (or under circumstances such that
it should have known) that as a result, the Weavers would purchase
some form of security from the borrowers.
If neither the agreement nor the CD is a security, there is
no point (nor any harm) in remanding the pendant state claims to the
trial court; it is settled law that if federal claims are dismissed
prior to trial, pendent state claims should also be dismissed.
either the agreement or the CD is a security, however, it is
appropriate to remand the pendent claims to the DC for its
consideration of whether they should be tried with the federal
claims.

If

f()·lt't2 ~~
t-

!Bk.

'

.

v ~

-

:· 741-Q Q,s .·

r

.. ~

-

,e..A.

4+
,I

"l...

·~ ~

"'~

'"

.,

. .

IIJ.... J...

,..

J\ ,,

,,

..

.,

.
,,

~

C y ~ ~.c.. ,-c.'f(/ ~ '
~~ -~,. -~r·· ·( f ID ~
~ aJ) .. , · . IV(.)

.J"L~

r,/-.ll:

(/

,.

~:·

,.

T;iil&.,

<1''.

·.

'

.,

~. ~.:

J'

':.J:

:o;·

,

··~. -*~·~!

.,~;~ ~: ~·

',1,

..

l.· n:

.

~

/f- ~ ~ IM-4-~wicJ.. ·~ ·~ ~J'. ~
~&-~ ~~ (g 3(!-..YJ.o).
· .: ·~· ·

l~)~. · ~{;-A1 ~ ~~r;:;.~ll..cJ
1 HJ ~- ·~~/.c., ~~-.{,.c.) A-C-/!-4-"
t'& /;:t#.f • ,
'',~
''!0<...

··

"':(;e..~ '-""11, ~...., .. ~f./~4.; ~~4.U.A.t
J
. ~~:~~"'-'-? ~- ~"":".-1<:4·-4).
'.1;

i;

'

~

:II<

,. '4. ~~ ~--·~ ~:icJ'
l;,

.._ ,~ ~re~TiZt-t ~.~•. •

...

'

.

appropriate for the DC to hear the pendent claims even if the
federal claims are dismissed (contrary to the bench memo); and (2) a
clarification of the SG's position (petr confused this point at oral
argument.
1.

Pendent claims.

In the bench memo, I stated that it

is settled law that when federal claims are dismissed prior to
trial, pendent claims should also be dismissed, citing United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.,S. 715 (1966).

In Gibbs, the Court stated

that when federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, pendent state
claims "should be dismissed as well."

But the Court was not

considering a case in which pendent state could no longer be brought
in state court.

----"7

In Rosado v. Wyman,397 U.S. 397 (1970), a three-judge court
was convened to hear a federal constitutional claim and a pendent
federal statutory claim.

--:z::::

Prior to a decision, but after some

hearings and argument, the federal constitutional claim was mooted.
The question therefore arose as to whether the three-judge court had
jurisdiction over the pendent federal statutory claim.

2.

The resps (in Rosado) argued that Gibbs was controlling and
that the pendent claim should have been dismissed because the claim
conferring jurisdiction on the three-judge court had been dismissed
before trial.

The Court did not agree, distinguishing Gibbs on the

ground that there, the Court was discussing an insubstantial
jurisdiction-conferring claim whereas in Rosado, the Court was
/ '

considering the mooting of a claim.

The Court noted that "[u]nlike

insubstantiality, which is apparent at the outset, mootness,
frequently a matter beyond the control of the parties, may not occur
until after substantial time and energy have been expended looking
toward the resolution of a dispute that plaintiffs were entitled to
bring in federal court."

Id., at 404.

The Court did not expressly

overrule the Gibbs dicta, however:
"Whether or not the view that an insubstantial federal
question does not confer jurisdiction--a maxim more
ancient than analytically sound--should now be held to
mean that a district court should be considered without
discretion, as opposed to power, to hear a pendent claim,
we think the respondents' analogy [from Gibbs to this
case] fails."
Thus, the Court explicitly rejected the analogy to Gibbs, rather
than overruling it, though it did express doubt that a DC would lack
the power to hear pendent state claims.
After Rosado, a strong argument can be made that a DC has

-----

jusrisdiction to consider state claims pendent to federal claims,
even federal claims dismissed prior to trial, and that this
jurisdiction should be exercised in appropiate instances to serve
the purposes of judicial efficiency and equity.
On March 17, 1978, the Weavers pledged their CD to the Bank
and the Bank loaned Columbus $65,000.

On May 4, 1979, the complaint

3.

was filed with the DC.

The action was dismissed for lack of any

federal question on Jan. 11, 1980.

At that time, the 1-year Pa.

statute of limitations for the state security-act claim (mentioned
for the first time at oral argument) barred the state security-act
claim.

There was still over two months in which to file the state

----------

---------------------------~'---------------~

common law-fraud claim.

At oral argument, resps argued that the dismissal was on

the eve of trial and, given the possible statute of limitation
problem, equity supports the exercise of jurisdiction by the DC.
I find this case a close one.

Provided there is a

substantial federal claim at the time a complaint is filed, the
better rule would seem to be a DC has jurisdiction to consider
pendent claims even if the federal claim is dismissed prior to
trial.
'-

~

Whether to exercise such jurisdiction would be a matter

committed to the discretion of the DC and would depend on the amount
of judicial resources already expended and the equities of the
situation (e.g., if the deft was on notice of the claims in the
federal action and the state statute of limitiations has run at time
federal claim is dismissed, the equities suggest that the DC retain
jurisdiction unless the deft is willing to waive the statute of
limitations in the state court proceeding).
In this case, the federal claim was not obviously

77

insubstantial in the sense that it was clear that there really was
no federal claim when the action was filed.

'

Thus, for example, if

the DC had gone ahead and tried the claims and then dismissed the
federal claim, it is clear that there was a substantial-enough claim
under Gibbs to support the exercise of jurisdiction over the state-

4.
law claims.

Whether to exercise jurisdiction given that the federal

~

claim was dismissed prior to trial should turn, therefore, on the

•

judicial resources already expended and the equitites of the
situtation.

At the time the case was dismissed, there had already

been discovery, the submission of pretrial narrative statements, and
a pre-trial conference.

It may be that much of this effort would

have to be duplicated were the state law claims tried in state
court.

Moreover, at the time of dismissal, according to the oral

argument, the state-security law claim was time-barred.

On the

otQer hand, the common law-fraud count was not time-barred, and
resps nevertheless made no attempt to file an effective fraud claim
in state court.

----------The DC will

be in a better position to judge these factors

than is this Court--especially the extent to which judicial
rescources have been expended and will be conserved by proceeding
with the state-law counts in federal court.

The question is not

even technically before the Court; as the case now stands, the
state-law counts have been remanded to the DC for its determination
of whether it should precede with them.
propriety of that remand.

Cert was not granted on the

This is the proper solution, though the

Court might mention in the decision that the DC was being given the
opportunity to consider whether, under Rosado, it should consider
the claims.

2.

The SG's position.

The Bank's lawyer maintained that

the SG had not conceded that all cos issued by federally-insured
banks are securities, but he was unable to point to a particular

5.
part of the SG's brief to illustrate his point.

The lawyer thought

that the SG had reserved the question of how the regulators would
treat CDs of federally-insured banks traded in a secondary market.
He was right.

This reservation is in the SG's brief, n.40 at 24:

"Another situation that may present a different
context is the trading of certificates of deposit in the
secondary market, a circumstance that is not presented in
this case."
I have never been sure what the SG meant by this.
traded after issue.

The CD here was

For purposes of the securities law, a pledge is

a sale, and the Weavers did, therefore, trade the CD for the W-P
agreement in a secondary (post-issue) transaction.

Perhaps the SG

only reserves the question in instances in which there is a more
formal "market," but, if so, he gives no guidance as to what factors
he considers relevant in distinguishing between this secondary sale
and a transaction in a secondary market.

~~
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of~~~
Court.
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We granted certiorari to decide whether two instrum~ ... A
j
·
a conventional certificate of dep.,osit and a business a1£_ee;;;nt~
between two fami1fes, coui(ibe consideroo securities tinder
·
•
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
I
Respondents, Sam and Alice Weaver, purchased a $50,000
certificate of deposit from petitioner, Marine Bank, on February 28, 1978. The certificate of deposit has a six year maturity and it is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. 1 The Weavers subsequently pledged the certificate of deposit to Marine Bank on March 17, 1978, to guarantee a $65,000 loan made by the Bank to Columbus Packing
Company. Columbus was a wholesale slaughterhouse and
The certificate of deposit pays 7'12% interest and provides that, if the
Bank permits early withdrawal, the depositor will earn interest at the
Bank's current savings passbook rate on the amount withdrawn, except
that no interest will be paid for the three months prior to withdrawal.
When the Weavers purchased the certificate of deposit, it could only be insured up to $40,000 by the FDIC. The ceiling on insured deposits is now
$100,000. Act of March 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 147,
§ 308(b)(1).
1

-;; \

j4 ~
J
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retail meat market which owed the Bank $33,000 at that time
for prior loans and was also substantially overdrawn on its
checking account with the Bank.
In consideration for guaranteeing the Bank's new loan, Columbus' owners, Raymond and Barbara Piccirillo•, entered
into an agreement with the Weavers. Under the terms of
the agreement, the Weavers were to receive 50% of Columbus' net profits and $100 per month as long as they guaranteed the loan. It was also agreed that the Weavers could use
Columbus' barn and pasture at the discretion of the
Piccirillos, and that they had the right to veto future borrowing by Columbus.
The Weavers allege that Bank officers told them Columbus
would use the $65,000 loan as working capital but instead it
was immediately applied to pay Columbus' overdue obligations. The Bank kept approximately $42,800 to satisfy its
prior loans and Columbus' overdrawn checking account. All
but $3,800 of the remainder was disbursed to pay overdue
taxes and to satisfy other creditors; the Bank then refused to
permit Columbus to overdraw its checking account. Columbus became bankrupt four months later. Although the Bank
had not yet resorted to the Weavers' certificate of deposit at
the time this litigation commenced, it acknowledged that its
other security was inadequate and that it intended to claim
the pledged certificate of deposit.
These allegations were asserted in a complaint filed in Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
in support of a claim that the Bank violated § 10(b) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b). The
Weavers also pleaded pendent claims for violations of the
Pennsylvania Securities Act and for common law fraud by the
Bank. The Weavers alleged that Bank officers actively solicited them to guarantee the $65,000 loan to Columbus while
knowing, but not disclosing, Columbus' financial plight or the
Bank's plans to repay itself from the new loan guaranteed by
the Weavers' pledged certificate of deposit. Had they
known of Columbus' precarious financial condition and the

80-1562-0PINION
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Bank's plans, the Weavers allege they would not have guaranteed the loan and pledged the certificate of deposit. The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Bank. It concluded that if a wrong occurred it did not take
place "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," as required for liability under § 10(b). The District
Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state
law claims.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Weaver v.
Marine Bank, 637 F. 2d 157 (CA3 1980). A divided court
held that a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that either the certificate of deposit or the agreement between the
Weavers and the Piccirillos was a security. 2 It therefore remanded for further consideration of the claim based on the
federal securities laws. The Court of Appeals also reversed
the District Court's dismissal of the pendent state law claims.
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1981), and wereverse. We hold that neither the certificate of deposit nor the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos is a security under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. We remand the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the pendent state claims should be dismissed.
II
The definition of security in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 3 is quite broad. The Act was adopted to restore inves2
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the pledge of a security is a
sale, an issue on which the federal circuits were split. We held in Rubin v.
United States,- U. S . - (1981), that a pledge of stock is equivalent
to a sale for the purposes of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Accordingly, in determining whether fraud may have occurred
here "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," the only
issue now before the Court is whether a security was involved.
3
Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10), provides:
"(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires(10) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
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tors' confidence in the financial markets, 4 and the term security was meant to include "the many types of instruments
that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept
of a security." H.R/Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11
(1933); quoted in V nited Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849-850 (1975). The statutory definition excludes only currency and notes with a maturity of
less than nine months. It includes ordinary stocks and
bonds, along with the "countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits .... " SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc., 328
U. S. 293, 299 (1946). Thus, the coverage of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws is not limited to instruments
traded at securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets, but extends to uncommon and irregular instruments.
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
404 U. S. 6, 10 (1971); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). We have repeatedly held that the
test "is what character the instrument is given in commerce
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the
ment or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateraltrust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit,
for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill
of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity is likewise limited."
We have consistently held that the definition of security in the 1934 Act is
essentially the same as the definition of security in § 2(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77(b)(1). United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975).
• Fitzgibbon, What is a Security? A R edefinition Based on Eligibility
to Participate in the Financial Markets , 64 Minn. L. Rev. 893, 912-918
(1980).
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economic inducements held out to the prospect." SEC v.
United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 387 U. S. 202, 211 (1967),
quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, 320
U. S., at 352-353.
The broad statutory definition is preceded, however, by
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be considered securities if "the context otherwise requires . . .. "
Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting thesecurities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for fraud. Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532
F. 2d 1252, 1253 (CA9 1976); Bellah v. First National Bank,
495 F. 2d 1109, 1114 (CA5 1974).

III
The Court of Appeals concluded that the certificate of deposit purchased by the Weavers might be a security. Examining the statutory definition, supra, n. 3, the court correctly
noted that the certificate of deposit is not expressly excluded
from the definition since it is not currency and it has a maturity exceeding nine months. 5
It concluded, however, that
the certificate of deposit was the functional equivalent of the
withdrawable capital shares of a savings and loan association
held to be securities in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332
(1967). The court also reasoned that, from an investor's
standpoint, a certificate of deposit is no different from any
other long-term debt obligation. 6 Unless distinguishing fea"The definition of a security in the 1934 Act, supra, n. 4, includes the
term, "certificate of deposit, for a security." However, this term does not
refer to certificates of deposit such as the Weavers purchased. Instead,
"certificate of deposit, for a security" refers to instruments issued by protective committees in the course of corporate reorganizations. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Fingland, 615 F. 2d 465, 468 (CA7 1980).
6
In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission had taken the position that certificates of deposit are
securities. However, the SEC has filed a brief as amicus curiae in this
case, jointly with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of
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tures were found on remand, the court concluded that the
certificate of deposit should be held to be a security.
Tcherepnin is not controlling. The withdrawable capital
shares found there to be securities did not pay a fixed rate of
interest; instead, purchasers received dividends based on the
association's profits. Purchasers also received voting rights.
In short, the withdrawable capital shares in Tcherepnin were
much more like ordinary shares of stock and "the ordinary
concept of a security," ante, at 4, than a certificate of deposit.
The Court of Appeals' also concluded that a certificate of
deposit is similar to any other long-term debt obligation commonly found to be a security. In our view, however, there is
an important difference between a bank certificate of deposit
and other long-term debt obligations. This certificate of deposit was issued by a federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the
banking industry. 7 Deposits in federally regulated banks
are protected by the reserve, reporting, and inspection requirements of the federal banking laws; advertising relating
to the interest paid on deposits is also regulated. 8 In addiGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which argues that the Weavers' certificate of deposit is
not a security.
7
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551
(1979), we held that a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not a
security. One of our reasons for our holding in Daniel was that the pension plan was regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA): "The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms of employee plans severely undercuts all arguments
for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension
plans." 439 U. S., at 569-570. Since ERISA regulates the substantive
terms of pension plans, and also requires certain disclosures, it was unnecessary to subject pension plans to the requirements of the federal securities laws as well.
8
See, e. g. 12 U. S. C. § 461(b) (reserve requirements); 12 U. S. C. (and
Supp. Ill) §§ 161, 324, and 1817 (reporting requirements); 12 U. S. C. (and
Supp. III) §§ 481, 483, and 1820(b) (inspection requirements); 12 CFR
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tion, deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Since its formation in 1933, nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by the FDIC have received payment in full, even payment for the portions of their deposits
above the amount insured. 1980 Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 18-21 (1981).
We see, therefore, important differences between a certificate of deposit purchased from a federally regulated bank and
other long-term debt obligations. The Court of Appeals
failed to give appropriate weight to the important fact that
the purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaranteed payment in full, whereas the holder of an ordinary longterm debt obligation assumes the risk of the borrower's insolvency. The definition of security in the 1934 Act provides
that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad
sweep of the Act is not to be considered a security if the context otherwise requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers
of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of
bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under
the federal banking laws. We therefore hold that the certificate of deposit purchased by the Weavers is not a security. 9
IV
The Court of Appeals also held that a finder of fact could
conclude that the separate agreement between the Weavers
and the Piccirillos is a security. Examining the statutory
language, supra, n. 3, the court found that the agreement
might be a "certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement" or an "investment contract." It
stressed that the agreement gave the Weavers a share in the
§§ 217.6 and 329.8 (advertising).
9
We reject respondents' argument that the certificate of deposit was
somehow transformed into a security when it was pledged, even though it
was not a security when purchased.
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profits of the slaughterhouse which would result from the efforts of the Piccirillos. Accordingly, in that court's view, the
agreement fell within the definition of investment contract
stated in Howey, because "the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. 8., at 301.
Congress intended the securities laws to cover those instruments ordinarily and commonly considered to be securities in the commercial world, but the agreement between the
Weavers and the Piccirillos is not the type of instrument that
comes to mind when the term security is used and does not
fall within "the ordinary concept of a security." Ante, at 4.
The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in
prior cases involved offers to a number of potential investors,
not a private transaction as in this case. In Howey, for example, 42 persons purchased interests in a citrus grove during a four-month period. 328 U. 8., at 295. In C.M. Joiner
Leasing, offers to sell oil leases were sent to over 1,000 prospects. 320 U. 8., at 346. In C.M. Joiner Leasing, we
noted that a security is an instrument in which there is "common trading." !d., at 351. The instruments involved in
C .M. Joiner Leasing and Howey had equivalent values to
most persons and could have been traded publicly.
)
Here, in contrast, the Piccirillos distributed no prospectus .
to the Weavers or to other potential investors, and the
unique agreement they negotiated was not desig'!!ed ,tv be
trad~d publicly. The provision that the Weavers could use
tlie barn and pastures of the slaughterhouse at the discretion
of the Piccirillos underscores the unique character of the
transaction. Similarly, the provision that the Weavers could
veto future loans gave them a measure of control over the operation of the slaughterhouse not characteristic of a security.
Although the agreement gave the Weavers a share of the
Piccirillos' profits, if any, that provision alone is not sufficient
to make that agreement a security. Accordingly, we hold
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that this unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the
parties, is not a security. 10

v
The Weavers allege that the Bank manipulated them so
that they would suffer the loss the Bank would have borne
from the failure of the Columbus Packing Company. Whatever claims they may have against the Bank are not before
the Court since the Court of Appeals did not treat the issue of
the pendent state law claims. Accordingly, the case is remanded for consideration of whether the District Court
should now entertain those claims.
Reversed and remanded.

Cf. Kotz, supra, 532 F. 2d, at 1260-1062 (Kennedy, J. , concurring) (unsecured note, the terms of which were negotiated face-to-face, given to a
bank in return for a business loan, is not a security) .
10
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CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Harch 3, 1982

Re:

80-1562 - Marine Bank v. Weaver

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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CtMNBERS OF

.,JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 3, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1562 - Marine Bank v. Weaver

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

<!Jtrttrl oJ Hrt ~nitdt ~fidel>
2)agfrhtgfott. ~ . <!J. 206J~;l

.§tttrttUU
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CHAM BERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N

j
Re :

No. 8 0 -156 2 - Marine Bank v . Weave r

Dear Chief :
Please join me .

The Chief Justice
cc : The Conference
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CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 5, 1982

Re:

80-1562 - Marine Bank v. Weaver

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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